Late in 1990, the Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions at Illinois Institute of Technology (lIT) received a grant of more than $200,000 from the National Science Foundation to try a campus-wide approach to integrating professional ethics into its technical curriculum.! Enough has now been accomplished to draw some tentative conclusions. I am the grant's principal investigator. In this paper, I shall describe what we at lIT did, what we learned, and what others, especially philosophers, can learn (...) from us. We set out to develop an approach that others could profitably adopt. I believe that we succeeded. (shrink)

The dissertation explores certain puzzles about fiction and existence. Some historical discussion of Brentano, Meinong and Russell sets the stage for an extended account of three neo-Meinongian semantic theories: those of Terence Parsons, Richard Routley , and Edward Zalta. It is argued that these authors rely on a false understanding of fiction. A distinction between setting out linguistic precedents in storytelling and following such precedents helps allow for the notion of being true in a story. However, fictional truth is not (...) a special case of truth nor is there any set of objects called 'fictional objects'. (shrink)

“Hooking up,” a popular type of sexual behavior among college students, has become a pathway to dating relationships. Based on open-ended narratives written by 273 undergraduates, we analyze how students interpreted a vignette describing a heterosexual hookup followed by a sexless first date. In contrast to the sexual script which holds that women want relationships more than sex and men care about sex more than relationships, students generally accorded women sexual agency and desire in the hookup and validated men’s post-hookup (...) relationship interest. However, in explaining the sexless date, students typically reasoned the woman was being chaste and withholding sex to redeem her reputation whereas they often characterized the man’s abstinence in terms of a pity date. The findings underscore the tenacity of gendered sexual scripts around heterosexual dates and hookups but also reveal fissures and contradictions that suggest some changes to the sexual double standard. (shrink)

R K Elliott; Education, Love of One’s Subject, and the Love of Truth, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 8, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 135–153, https:/.

Approximately 50 years have passed since Judith Jarvis Thomson wrote A Defense of Abortion (1971). Her article has significantly shaped the philosophical literature on abortion. In this paper, I will summarize some of the interesting and important work done on the topic since Thomson's article. I will highlight Thomson as a defender of the claim that abortion is morally permissible and Don Marquis as an influential opponent of that claim. I will start by articulating Thomson's case, focusing on the violinist (...) analogy. I will underscore key questions, concepts, and objections the analogy raises. I will then examine briefly how philosophers have addressed some of these issues. Next, I will outline Marquis’ work, provide a similar commentary on it, and discuss some of its main responses. I will then survey other philosophers who have addressed abortion beyond the scope of providing specific replies to Thomson or Marquis. I will close by highlighting significant points of agreement and disagreement in the literature, as well as crucial gaps in the current research. The paper is not an attempt to address every work on the topic over the last five decades, nor is it aimed at taking a position on the moral permissibility of abortion. My goal is to provide an overview of the dialectic. (shrink)

R K Elliott; D. W. Hamlyn on Knowledge and the Beginnings of Understanding, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 109–116.

R K Elliott; Aestheticism, Imagination and Schooling: a reply to Ruby Meager, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 33–42.

R K Elliott; The Concept of Creativity, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 5, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 97–104, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.19.

R K Elliott; Objectivity and Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 16, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 49–62, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.19.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Uttering the Unutterable: Aristotle, Religion, and Literature by Louis GroarkeJay R. ElliottGROARKE, Louis. Uttering the Unutterable: Aristotle, Religion, and Literature. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2023. 336 pp. Cloth, $120.00Louis Groarke’s Uttering the Unutterable is an extraordinarily ambitious book. Its aims include: to provide a definition of literature; to argue that literature must be morally good; to argue that literature is necessarily concerned with an “utterable” transcendent reality; to (...) advance a version of Aristotelian realism in metaphysics and epistemology; to defend the Western “tradition” in literature and philosophy; to criticize the entire enterprise of structuralist and poststructuralist literary theory; to criticize the entire enterprise of analytic philosophy of language; to resurrect the Chicago School of literary criticism associated with figures such as R. S. Crane and Richard McKeon; to relitigate the mid-twentieth-century battles between the Chicago School and “New Criticism”; and to offer an homage to Groarke’s former teacher, the Chicago-trained Bernard Suits.At the center of Groarke’s project is his aspiration to formulate an Aristotelian literary theory and to defend it against a wide variety of alternative perspectives. But as the above list of Groarke’s ambitions suggests, he carries out this aspiration in a highly unusual way. For Groarke, questions of literary theory are not to be debated exclusively— or even primarily—through discussion of literature. This book contains very few examples of literary works, and none of them is discussed in depth. Indeed, for Groarke, matters of literary theory are not even to be [End Page 719] discussed primarily in terms of literary theory. Rather, Groarke’s central conviction is that we can approach literature properly only by situating it within the context of certain fundamental questions in epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and religion. Readers who pick up this work expecting a discussion of Aristotle’s Poetics will be sorely disappointed. Groarke barely mentions this seminal work of Aristotelian literary criticism. Rather, his project begins from a diagnosis of what ails contemporary literary criticism: that it suffers, not so much from a false view of literature, as from a false view of truth, goodness, and reality. He accordingly undertakes to provide a better view of those fundamental matters, one that he derives from aspects of Aristotle’s thought. According to Groarke, it is these aspects of Aristotle that have the most to offer literary theorists today.Groarke draws his most important Aristotelian inspiration from Aristotle’s discussion of theōria in Nicomachean Ethics 10.7–8. In Groarke’s view, Aristotelian theōria is a truthful vision of a supreme reality that transcends human life and pervades the universe. This vision, for Groarke, is what literature is (or should be) about. On this basis, he critiques forms of literary criticism that see literature as concerned only with politics, or with class distinctions, or with entertainment, or with language itself. As Groarke sums up his argument: “[L]iterature supplies opportunities for intelligence gathered up in an artful and superlative moment of beholding of what is fundamental, real, meaningful, and true. Literature provides an avenue for contemplation (theōria), facilitating a divine-like gaze upon the world.” For Groarke, Aristotelian theōria allows us to behold what is “fundamental, real, meaningful, and true.” It is especially valuable because it affirms the essential unity of these attributes. Like Aristotle’s god, Groarke’s transcendent reality is simultaneously the highest reality and the summation of all value. For Groarke, to engage in theōria is thus to affirm that the universe is suffused with moral significance. It is this stance that Groarke thinks literature should promote.I have a great deal of sympathy both for Groarke’s reading of Aristotle and for his sense that these aspects of his thought are relevant to fundamental questions about literature. But I found the experience of reading this book challenging. The bulk of Groarke’s work is not devoted to developing his Aristotelian conception, applying it to literary case studies, or considering any problems it might raise. Rather, Groarke applies most of his time and energy to attacking what he perceives to be the myriad enemies of his Aristotelian outlook in the... (shrink)

R K Elliott; Louis Arnaud Reid: a remembrance, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 20, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 3–6, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-97.

If beliefs are a map by which we steer, then, ceteris paribus, we should want a more accurate map. However, the world could be structured so as to punish learning with respect to certain topics—by learning new information, one’s situation could be worse than it otherwise would have been. We investigate whether the world is structured so as to punish learning specifically about moral nihilism. We ask, if an ordinary person had the option to learn the truth about moral nihilism, (...) ought she to take it? We argue, given plausible assumptions about ordinary human preferences, she should not. (shrink)

R K Elliott; Versions of Creativity, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 5, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 139–152, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1971.

R K Elliott; The Concept of Development: A Reply to Professor Hamlyn, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 9, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 40–48, https://d.

Did Plato see something that Aristotle missed? According to a familiar narrative, Plato regarded literature as dangerous to the aims of philosophy, and he accordingly exiled the poets from his ideal republic. By contrast, Aristotle is supposed to have reconciled literature and philosophy, not only through his appreciative account of epic and tragedy in the Poetics but also through his invocations of literary examples at crucial junctures elsewhere in his corpus, for example his use of the Trojan legend of Priam (...) in the Nicomachean Ethics. (shrink)

Can a pain-belief such as “I feel pain” be fallibly justified and luckily true? In this discussion note, I provide a Gettier-type example to show that a belief about one’s own pain can be held on fallible justification and a matter of epistemic luck for its believer. This example underscores the significance of introspection and direct awareness in such epistemic situations. Moreover, perhaps surprisingly, the example suggests that one can, at the same time and with regard to the same body (...) part, though in different respects, both know and not know “I feel pain.” The knowledge is possessed in terms of acquaintance; the lack of knowledge is explainable in terms of non-introspective justification. (shrink)

In Nicomachean Ethics III.5, Aristotle argues that virtue and vice are “up to us and voluntary.” Readers have long struggled to make sense of Aristotle’s arguments in this chapter and to explain how they cohere with the rest of his ethical project. Among the most influential lines of complaint is that the argument of III.5 appears to contradict his emphasis elsewhere on the power of upbringing to shape character, beginning in childhood. Scholars have developed two main interpretive approaches to III.5, (...) which I label “libertarian” and “compatibilist.” I argue that neither approach succeeds in removing the appearance of contradiction. I develop an alternative interpretation that reveals the coherence of Aristotle’s commitments, showing that for him the voluntariness of character and the power of upbringing are in reality two sides of the same philosophical coin. Both are grounded in his fundamental idea that virtue and vice are acquired by practice. (shrink)

Quartz & Sejnowski (Q&S) disregard evidence that suggests that their view of dendrites is inadequate and they ignore recent results concerning the role of neurotrophic factors in synaptic remodelling. They misrepresent neuronal selectionism and thus erect a straw-man argument. Finally, the results discussed in section 4.2 require neuronal proliferation, but this does not occur during the period of neuronal development of relevance here. Footnotes1 Address correspondence to TE at [email protected].

In this essay, I address an objection to purpose theory (PT). PT holds that fulfilling the purpose God has assigned for humans is a way for human life to be objectively meaningful. According to the objection, PT entails the absurdity that God is irrational. There are at least two versions. I refer to them as Irrationality Objection-1 (IO-1), raised elsewhere by Thaddeus Metz, and Irrationality Objection-2 (IO-2), which I raise in this essay. I summarize IO-1 and replies to it by (...) Metz. I then articulate IO-2 and support the following thesis: if God has middle knowledge (MK), IO-2 fails. (shrink)

This paper locates the contributions of Kauffman and Ayala to this symposium in the context of recent discussions of the adequacy of the Modern Synthesis. The neglect of morphology and development described by Kauffman is understandable in view of the belief that selection is the most powerful evolutionary force. His idea that properties of order may be explained by nonselective mechanisms is also examined. The paper subsequently takes up Ayala's criticism of S.J. Gould's view that macroevolution is a process "decoupled" (...) from microevolution. It is argued that the idea of species selection makes Gould's antireductionism ontological in character; this contrasts with Ayala's contention that the decoupling is merely epistemological. (shrink)

Possible worlds models of belief have difficulties accounting for unawareness, the inability to entertain (and hence believe) certain propositions. Accommodating unawareness is important for adequately modelling epistemic states, and representing the informational content to which agents have in principle access given their explicit beliefs. In this paper, I develop a model of explicit belief, awareness, and informational content, along with an sound and complete axiomatisation. I furthermore defend the model against the seminal impossibility result of Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini, according (...) to which three intuitive conditions preclude non-trivial unawareness on any possible worlds model of belief. (shrink)

In this essay, I assess Timothy Blank’s “The Open Theistic Multiverse.” In his article, Blank attempts to show that Open Theism explains how God can plan the creation of a multiverse containing creatures with libertarian freedom. I underscore some benefits of Blank’s article while arguing that, despite its strengths, his paper fails to provide a sufficient explanation of God’s precreational planning.

R K Elliott; Education and Justification, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 11, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 7–27, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1.

According to purpose theory (PT), God’s existence, telic creation of human beings, and human libertarian free will are necessary conditions for human life to be objectively meaningful. In this paper, I raise and respond to four objections to PT: two concerning insufficiencies and two regarding ambiguities in the theory. I conclude that PT-advocates have relatively effective replies to the second insufficiency objection and to both ambiguity objections, but that PT is vulnerable to the first insufficiency objection.

R. K. Elliott; VIII—Aesthetic Theory and the Experience of Art, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 67, Issue 1, 1 June 1967, Pages 111–126, https:/.

Scholars have long debated how exactly Aristotle thinks that agents acquire the distinctivearchai(“principles” or “starting‐points”) that govern their practical reasoning. The debate has traditionally been dominated by anti‐intellectualists, who hold that for Aristotle all agents acquire theirarchaisolely through a process of habituation in the nonrational soul. Their traditional opponents, the intellectualists, focus their argument on the case of the virtuous person, arguing that in Aristotle’s view virtuous agents acquire theirarchaithrough a process of reasoning. I intervene in this debate in two (...) main ways: first, I press a heretofore underappreciated objection against anti‐intellectualism, that it is inconsistent with Aristotle’s account ofakrasia; and second, I urge that all sides in the debate would benefit from more sustained attention to Aristotle’s nonvirtuous character types. In the final section, I suggest that proper consideration of the full breadth of Aristotle’s account of character points in the direction of a new approach that I call “character pluralism,” according to which Aristotle’s moral psychology does not involve a single conception of psychic structure or moral development that is equally applicable to all character types. (shrink)

This paper begins with a puzzle regarding Lewis' theory of radical interpretation. On the one hand, Lewis convincingly argued that the facts about an agent's sensory evidence and choices will always underdetermine the facts about her beliefs and desires. On the other hand, we have several representation theorems—such as those of (Ramsey 1931) and (Savage 1954)—that are widely taken to show that if an agent's choices satisfy certain constraints, then those choices can suffice to determine her beliefs and desires. In (...) this paper, I will argue that Lewis' conclusion is correct: choices radically underdetermine beliefs and desires, and representation theorems provide us with no good reasons to think otherwise. Any tension with those theorems is merely apparent, and relates ultimately to the difference between how 'choices' are understood within Lewis' theory and the problematic way that they're represented in the context of the representation theorems. For the purposes of radical interpretation, representation theorems like Ramsey's and Savage's just aren't very relevant after all. (shrink)

In this paper, I challenge a traditional assumption concerning the nature and aims of education. According to epistemic infallibilism, propositional knowledge requires epistemic certainty. Though some philosophers accept infallibilism, others consider it implausible because it does not recognize ordinary cases of supposed knowledge. On this objection, we possess many items of propositional knowledge, notwithstanding the fallibleness of these items. Infallibilism is inconsistent with such items and thus considered unwarranted. I articulate this kind of objection to infallibilism as it concerns education. (...) I then offer a cumulative case defense of infallibilism and evaluate that defense. This examination suggests that much of what we commonly consider as education does not provide knowledge, and therefore that the traditional assumption is incorrect. My paper has interdisciplinary interests with respect to epistemology, philosophy of education, philosophy of science, and pedagogical practice. (shrink)

R.K. Elliott's essays on aesthetics put forward a number of common themes that together constitute a unified approach to aesthetics. Throughout his writing, Elliott combines analytic rigour with sympathy for ideas in continental philosophy. This book, the first to gather together Elliott's key essays, powerfully illuminates the unifying role of imagination and the aesthetic in human experience.

For Plato and Aristotle, arete (traditionally translated as "virtue") was the essential object of human admiration and striving, and even the key to happiness. Their work continues to inspire reflection on fundamental questions of ethics and politics today, as the fourteen new essays collected here demonstrate. -/- Contributors: Lidia Palumbo, Eva Anagnostou-Laoutides, Ryan M. Brown, Jay R. Elliott, Guilherme Domingues da Motta, Federico Casella, Jonathan A. Buttaci, George Harvey, Mark Ralkowski, Gary S. Beck, Paula Gottlieb, Giulio di Basilio, Audrey (...) L. Anton, and Elena Bartolini. (shrink)

Traditional analyses of the curve fitting problem maintain that the data do not indicate what form the fitted curve should take. Rather, this issue is said to be settled by prior probabilities, by simplicity, or by a background theory. In this paper, we describe a result due to Akaike [1973], which shows how the data can underwrite an inference concerning the curve's form based on an estimate of how predictively accurate it will be. We argue that this approach throws light (...) on the theoretical virtues of parsimoniousness, unification, and non ad hocness, on the dispute about Bayesianism, and on empiricism and scientific realism. * Both of us gratefully acknowledge support from the Graduate School at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and NSF grant DIR-8822278 (M.F.) and NSF grant SBE-9212294 (E.S.). Special thanks go to A. W. F. Edwards.William Harper. Martin Leckey. Brian Skyrms, and especially Peter Turney for helpful comments on an earlier draft. (shrink)